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Abstract 
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the currency crisis and 
recovery in three East Asian countries, Malaysia, Thailand and South 
Korea.  Using macro economic data for the three countries over a 13 year 
period, 1990 – 2002, the paper examines the factors leading to the crisis, 
the policy response to the crisis, an evaluation of their recovery and the 
lessons that can be learnt.  During the seven year period prior to the crisis, 
all three countries experienced very rapid GDP growth.  Collectively, 
average annual GDP growth was 11.5%.  This growth however was fueled 
by rapid monetary growth, current account deficits, negative S-I gaps and 
short term capital inflows.  As a result, serious structural weaknesses were 
built.  Overvalued exchange rates enhanced the vulnerabilities.  The two 
year period of crisis, saw sharply negative GDP growth in all three 
countries.  These were accentuated by the contractionary policies.  While 
Thailand and South Korea had to turn to the IMF and adopt the IMF 
package, Malaysia took the ‘unorthodox’ route of capital controls and 
currency peg.  The paper argues that despite different policy stance the 
underlying responses were the same.  All three countries experienced a V-
shaped recovery.  Malaysia’s controversial policies appears to have 
provided no additional advantage.  The paper concludes with an outline of 
key lessons for policy makers from the experience of the three countries. 
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 East Asia’s currency crisis of 1997/98 was probably the most contagious of 
recent economic crises.  Several countries, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea 
and the Philippines were  hit directly while others such as Taiwan, Singapore and 
especially Hong Kong were badly affected1.  What began as a speculative attack on the 
Thai Baht in July 1997, quickly spread as ‘contagion’ to the other countries.  Over the 3 
month period from July to October 1997, the Baht had fallen close to 40%, the Malaysian 
Ringgit and Philippine Peso by about 27%, the Indonesian Rupiah  by about 40% and 
the Korean Won approximately 35% against the US dollar.  For countries that had been 
dubbed “miracle economies” this was a serious blow. 
 
 The currency crisis quickly metamorphosed into what economists call a “twin 
crisis”.  In essence, slumping currencies and the policy response to defending them, set 
off in turn, a domestic banking crisis.  This happened in particular to four countries, S. 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.  Indonesia, faced with both economic and 
political crises went into a tailspin.  Singapore and Taiwan largely escaped unscathed 
while HK had to take “innovative” steps to continue defending its currency peg and its 
property and stock markets.  Clearly, the impact was differential, some  countries were 
affected much more than others, in obvious relation to the extent of vulnerability that had 
been built.  If most observers had been surprised at how quickly these countries had 
succumbed to crisis, their sharp and rapid recovery would have been equally surprising.  
Especially since, the policy response, at least where publicly announced government 
stance was concerned, was indeed different. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In differentiating between crisis and affected counties we use the standard  definition of a 25%  depreciation of the 
currency to denote a crisis. 
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OBJECTIVE & MOTIVATION 
 The objective of this paper is to undertake an empirical analysis of the factors 
leading to the crisis, the policy response of the sample countries, an evaluation of their 
recovery and the lessons that can be learnt.  In line with this, the paper is designed to 
address the following four research questions; i)  How had these countries performed in 
the years leading to the crisis?  ii)  What was the policy response to the currency crisis 
and what similarities/differences were there in policy response across countries?  iii)  
How have the sample countries performed post crisis and iv)  what lessons can we 
learn? 
 
 We address these questions by analyzing the macro economic data of three 
countries, Malaysia, Thailand and Korea over a 13 year period, 1990 to 20022.   The 13 
year period is divided into 3 time segments.  The period 1990-96 the pre crisis period, 
1997 and 98 which is considered the period of the crisis and 1999 – 2003 the period of 
recovery.  The other well known crisis country, Indonesia has been left out since its 
current problems are heavily confounded by political rather than economic ones.  Except 
where otherwise stated, all data is sourced from the Asia Recovery Information Center 
(ARIC) of the Asian Development Bank.  The paper is divided into 5 sections.  Section 2 
below, provides an overview of relevant literature and evaluates the economic 
performance of the sample countries in the 7 years prior to crisis, 1990 – 96.  Section 3, 
examines the crisis period 1997 and 98 and the policy response.  Section 4 outlines the 
recovery, while the final section, evaluates the recovery and analyses the lessons learnt. 
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 Where available data for the first two quarters of 2003 is also used. 
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SECTION 2 
2.1: Overview of Literature 
 The need to understand currency crises has received much attention.  This,  has 
largely been due to the increased frequency of such crashes.  Several alternative 
explanations have been put forth to explain currency induced crises.  Broadly speaking, 
we could categorize these into four broad categories3; (i) The existence of structural 
weaknesses and/or policy distortions.  (ii) Moral hazard (iii) Self fulfilling panics and (iv) 
Temporary illiquidity. 
 
Structural Weaknesses and/or Policy Distortions 
 This is probably the most often cited explanation for currency induced crises.  
Krugman (1979), views currency crises as speculative attacks resulting from 
deteriorating fundamentals.  Budget deficits, excessive monetary growth, current 
account deficits and reserve losses are typical pre-conditions.  When underlying 
fundamentals are inconsistent with the existing pegged exchange rate, a speculative 
attack results.  More recently Frankel & Kose (1996), using data for 100 countries over a 
20 year period, find that there were several common features of crash countries.   
Among these were (i) very high levels of debt financed by commercial banks on variable 
interest rates, sharp reductions in FDI inflows and overvalued exchange rates.  Goldfajn 
and Valdes (1997) also find that  exchange rate overvaluation are good predictors of 
impending crises.  Since an exchange rate regime is government determined, 
overvaluations are nothing but purely policy induced distortions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 See IMF Working Paper WP/01/154 
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Moral Hazard 
 
 Moral hazard arising from the existence of either actual or implicit guarantees 
have been put forth as yet another explanation.  Most of the work have been within the 
asymmetric information framework.  Frankel (1999) and Hahn & Mishkin (2000)4,  argue 
that the combination of informational asymmetries, implicit guarantees  and lack of 
transparency accentuate adverse selection problems making the underlying economies 
vulnerable.  These vulnerabilities remain masked until just before the crisis. 
 
Illiquidities 
 Feldstein (1998, 1999)5 and Calvo & Mendoza (1996) point to temporary 
illiquidities arising from rapid build up in short term external debt.  A crisis can be 
touched off when a country’s ability to service outstanding short-term debt appears 
questionable.  Calvo & Mendoza, argue that when large gaps exist in the stock of liquid 
financial assets and gross reserves in the presence of a pegged exchange rate, 
vulnerability builds.  Given these imbalances, a sudden shock can quickly drain 
reserves, making the fixed exchange rate unsustainable. 
 
Herding & Self Fulfilling Panics 
 Herding leads to self fulfilling panics because rational investors would want to 
pull out their money if they believe other investors would do the same.  When all 
investors hit the exits at the same time, a self fulfilling crisis begins.  When they decide 
to pull out of  other markets, contagion is the result.    Radelet & Sachs  (2001) and 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) propose herding and self fulfilling panics as causes 
of crises.  The latter authors, analyzing data for 20 emerging markets, argue however 
                                                 
4In IMF Working Paper WP/01/154 
5In IMF Working Paper WP/01/154 
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that for contagion and crisis to happen, there must have been some “degree of previous 
misbehavior”. 
  
Depending on how one looks at it, the Asian Currency Crisis could be explained 
by all 4 of the above propositions.  While factors like a self fulfilling panic or temporary 
illiquidity could have touched off the crisis, this paper will argue that  prior to the crisis, 
there existed serious structural weaknesses and policy distortions in all three sample 
countries. 
 
2.2: Pre-Crisis (1990 – 96) 
 If there is one feature that can characterize economic  performance in the three 
sample countries  prior to the crisis, it must be the stellar growth record.  Over the seven 
year period, 1990 – 96, all three countries experienced very rapid GDP growth.  Table 1 
below shows the compounded annual growth rate and the cumulative growth for the 
period. 
Table 1 
1990 –96 Nominal GDP Growth % 
 
Compounded  
Annual Growth 
Cumulative  
Compounded Growth 
Malaysia 11.63% 116% 
Thailand 11.22% 110.6% 
S. Korea 11.7% 117.4% 
   
Average 11.52% 114.67% 
 
The three countries had an average annual growth of 11.52% over the seven year 
period.  This is indeed impressive performance by any measure.  With cumulative 
growth above 100%, all three countries had more than doubled their GDP in the seven 
year period.  It is not surprising therefore that these economies were referred to in 
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glowing terms as “miracle economies”.  Yet in the subsequent two years, 1997 and 98, 
all three countries we reeling in trouble.  So what went wrong? 
 
 The key to understanding what went wrong lies in examining how these GDP 
growth rates were financed.  The growth pump was being primed by three broad means; 
a) rapid monetary growth, (b)  large current account deficits and (c) capital inflows. 
 
a) Rapid Domestic Monetary Growth 
 Rapid domestic monetary growth appears to be a common feature of all three 
countries in the pre-crisis period.  Table 2 below shows how much the monetary lever 
had been used to fuel growth. 
Table 2 
1990 – 96, Growth in Real GDP, M2 and Domestic Credit 
 
Real GDP M2 Domestic Credit 
Malaysia 7.33 15.5 20.1 
Thailand 6.86 13.6 21.3 
Korea 6.31 14.6 17.8 
 
Average 
 
6.8 
 
14.6 
 
19.7 
 
United States 
 
1.75 
 
2.14 
 
NA 
 
Two things are evident from the above table.  First, money supply as measured by M2, 
has grown more than twice the rate of growth in real GDP.  Second, Domestic Credit 
had grown approximately three times real GDP.  Such deviations between real and 
monetary growth can be harmful when sustained over a period of time.  As we will see 
later, this led to serious distortions/vulnerabilities. 
 
b) Current Account Deficits; Negative Savings – Investment Gap. 
Table A17 in Appendix shows the Current Account Balance as a percent of GDP.  
Current Account deficits have been pointed out as one of the key reasons for the 
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currency crisis.  Notice that all three countries had current account deficits for every one 
of the seven years before the crisis.  In many instances the percentage was larger than 
the 5% thresold which economist consider a risk level.  There are a number of reasons 
for this consistent deficit.  The first reason is the obvious push in all these countries for 
growth.  Rapid GDP growth requires heavy investment growth.  Thus, the import of 
capital goods increased and import growth outpaced that of exports in several years.  
(Tables A4, A5 in Appendix). 
 
There is yet another way by which a high growth policy can lead to current 
account deficits.  From a theoretical viewpoint, a country is likely to run current account 
deficits  if it has a savings – investment gap.  Essentially, the savings – investment gap 
reflects the net imports needed to finance the gap.  Though East Asia is legendary for its 
high savings rate (approximately 35% of GDP) the very high investment rates needed to 
sustain the high growth objective has meant that the S-I gap was negative for all three 
countries in the seven years pre-crisis.  Malaysia and Thailand had a negative S-I gap 
averaging 6.2% of GDP.  Korea’s was much lower at 1.7% (see Table A6 in Appendix). 
 
c) Capital Inflows : - Reliance on Short-Term Inflows 
 The flip side of a current account deficit is a capital account surplus.  Holding 
reserves constant, a current account deficit must be matched by a capital account 
surplus.  What this implies is that; the net imports of the current account will have to be 
financed by foreign capital inflows.  As such, all our crisis countries have had capital 
account surpluses; meaning strong capital inflows.  Large capital inflows in itself is not a 
problem.  It is the form and composition of the inflows that really matters.  Inflows in the 
form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are long term in nature and add to productive 
capacity.  However, inflows in the form of Portfolio Investments or short term 
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deposits/borrowing can be destabilizing.  With the opening of China and other countries 
like Vietnam and Cambodia, the traditional recipients such as our sample countries saw 
declining FDI inflows.  Their high growth strategies however meant that capital inflows 
were needed to continually fuel the growth. 
 
 Though FDI inflows still constituted a major portion, short term inflows in the form 
of portfolio investments and borrowing were increasing.  Tables A7, A8 and A9 of 
Appendix show the increased reliance on loans and the composition of these loans.  In 
each case we see a gradual increase in total Foreign Loans both in absolute terms and 
as percent of GDP.  Total foreign loans as a percentage of GDP approaches 40% for 
Thailand and exceeds 25% for Korea.  Malaysia’s foreign loans stand at 22% of GDP as 
at December 1996.  Table A9 shows the composition of these loans.  Short  term loans 
constitute more than two thirds of total loans for Korea.  Thailand’s exceeds 65% while 
Malaysia’s is at 56%.  Clearly, in all three cases, there has been a heavy reliance on 
short term inflows. 
 
From Structural Weaknesses to Vulnerabilities 
 If the above factors show the structural weaknesses that were being built, a 
number of other policy induced distortions aggravated these weaknesses.  Two such 
factors are worth noting.  The first had to do with the exchange rate regime while the 
second financial liberalization. 
 
 All three sample countries were on quasi peg systems with their currency being 
managed within narrow bands.  While such a system reduces currency volatility, it 
requires that domestic monetary policies be in conformity with that of the currency to 
which it is pegged.  Since in all three cases the “peg” exchange rate policy had been to 
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keep the domestic currency within a narrow band against the US$, monetary policy 
deviations were putting stress on the exchange rate.  We saw in Table 2 above, how 
monetary growth in the sample countries was several fold that of the US  for the 1990 – 
96 period.  Additionally, annual inflation rates for the 3 countries averaged 5% for the 
same seven year period, while that of the US was 2.6%.  Thus, by all parity measures, 
their currencies should have depreciated against the US$.  However, since the 
exchange rate regime was to keep the currency within narrow bands, the currencies 
were becoming overvalued in real terms even though they were about the same in 
nominal terms.  Going by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), based on annual CPI 
numbers, the Ringgit, Baht and Won had a percentage overvaluation as at end 
December 1996 of 12.5%, 31.3% and 35.4 respectively.  Coupled with the fact that all 
three countries had low levels of international reserves, with the lowest levels recorded 
in 19976, meant that these currencies were ripe for a speculative attack. (Table A12). 
 
 When the exchange rate regime is seen with the financial liberalization that had 
been taking place, the build up in vulnerability seems to have been inevitable.  Critics 
have pointed to the sequencing of liberalization as having been the problem.  Instead of 
first strengthening the domestic banking sector before enabling them to source funds 
overseas, the opposite appears to have been the case – at least in Thailand and South 
Korea.  In 1993 for example, the Korean government removed controls on short-term 
foreign borrowing by Korean banks7.  Since this was done while controls on direct 
access to foreign capital markets by Korean firms remained, the proportion of short term 
debt exploded and created a serious maturity mismatch.  A similar situation was played 
out in Thailand.  There, as part of Capital account liberalization, the Thai government 
established “The Bangkok International Banking Facility” (BIBF).  Thai Banks used the 
                                                 
6
 The low 1997 amount may also be due to reserves lost in defending the currency. 
7
 See- IMF Working Paper (WP/01/154) 
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facility to raise foreign currency loans which were then recycled domestically as Baht 
loans.  The rationale was the large interest spread that they were earning.  That this was 
extremely risky from a currency exposure viewpoint was ignored.  Thus in both countries 
the banking system had built up huge foreign currency loans and exposure8. 
 
 On the eve of the crisis in mid 1997,  all three economies had also built serious 
financial sector fragility.  The main contributor to this was the huge build up in leverage – 
both domestic  and foreign.  The build up in leverage being caused by the earlier 
monetary policy looseness and capital inflows.  Asset bubbles,  particularly, in the 
sectors most malleable to speculative activity, properties and stocks (shares) were a 
feature in all three countries. 
 
 Not only were the banks that financed this leveraging over extended,  their 
situation was worsened by skewness in their direction of lending.  In Malaysia for 
example, more than half of all loans were directed at the Broad Property Sector and 
financing of shares.  Among the three countries, it was in Thailand that the property 
market bubble was worst.  In Korea the lending was mostly to the Chaebols 
(conglomerates), resulting in debt/equity ratios of 4 or 5 times for these firms. 
 
 The result was that the domestic corporate sector was both highly leveraged and 
had unhedged foreign currency exposures.  The domestic banking sector  on the other 
hand, in having done the lending, was overextended and in Korea and Thailand had 
financed the lending with large amounts of foreign currency borrowing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The Malaysian banking system did not have the same extent of foreign currency exposure because of the Central 
bank’s enforcement of  “The Exchange Control Act”. 
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SECTION 3: The Crisis Period – 1997 & 1998 
 
 The catalyst that led from vulnerability to full blown crisis was the speculative 
attack on the Thai Baht in July 1997.  The initial attack worsened and spread as 
contagion to the other East Asian countries when it was revealed that the Thai central 
bank’s level of usable reserves was much less than what was originally reported.   
 
 The speculative attack itself was not new.  These same currencies had come 
under a similar attack in early 1995 following the Mexican Peso crisis.  Whereas they 
had successfully defended their currencies in 1995, this time it was different.  What was 
different this time was the massive capital outflow.  With hindsight, it now appears that 
more than the speculative attack, it was indeed the capital outflow that led to full blown 
crisis.  In Thailand for example, the estimated capital outflow as percent of GDP was 
26% within the first six months of the crisis.  This supercedes the largest ever previous 
record reversal of 20% of GDP for Argentina in the 1980s.  The massive capital flight 
was probably the reaction to the vulnerabilities that had been building up and now laid 
bare by depreciating currencies. 
 
 Three things worked against the Central banks in their efforts to stabilize their 
currencies.  Capital flight, low reserves and interest rates.  Faced with capital outflows 
that were pressuring their currencies and low reserves with which to defend, the central 
banks had little choice but to float their currencies and raise interest rates to prevent a 
free fall.  Given the highly leveraged nature of their domestic economies, raising interest 
rates was extremely painful and counter productive in some ways.  Clearly, pre crisis 
events had provided speculators with the classic one-way option. 
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 With depreciating currencies,  rising interest rates became the mechanism by 
which the currency crisis was transmitted into a domestic banking sector crisis.  By early 
1998, all three countries showed signs of what in the literature is known as the “twin-
crisis”.  The banking sector in all three countries took a hit.  As the corporate/real sector 
began to reel under sharply increased interest rates, Non Performing Loans (NPLs) 
spiked.  The banking was faced with near collapse.  Table 3 below, provides a summary 
of key economic variables for the two year crisis period. 
Table 3 
Crisis & Macro Variables 
 
Real Sector 1997 1998 
 
Real GDP Growth 
Malaysia 7.3 -7.4 
S. Korea 5.0 -6.7 
Thailand -1.4 -10.5 
 
Consumption Expenditure Growth 
 Private Public Private Public 
Malaysia 9.3 -10.2 8.9 -8.9 
S. Korea 9.1 -11.7 40.6 -0.4 
Thailand 4.4 -11.5 1.6 3.9 
 
Gross Domestic Investment Growth 
Malaysia 12 -44 
S. Korea -8 -38 
Thailand -22 -51 
 
Monetary Sector -  M2 Growth % 
Malaysia 23 2 
S. Korea 14 24 
Thailand 16 10 
 
3 Month Interbank Rate 
Malaysia ___ ____ 
S. Korea 14.1 14.6 
Thailand 17 16.8 
 
Domestic Credit Growth 
Malaysia 29.3 -2.7 
S. Korea 23.3 11.6 
Thailand 34.3 -1.3 
 
Capital Acct. Balance % of GDP 
Malaysia -6.0 -7.2 
S. Korea -4.4 -4.8 
Thailand -6.0 -4.9 
 
Unemployment Rate (%) 
Malaysia 2.6 3.2 
S. Korea 2.6 6.8 
Thailand 0.9 4.4 
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The severity of the crisis is evident from the GDP growth numbers.  All three 
countries experienced sharp contraction in growth over both years – particularly in 1998.  
Average GDP growth for the 3 countries approximates negative (-) 8% for 1998, a sharp 
contrast to the 11.5% average for the seven years crisis.  The sharp fall in GDP growth 
was due to significant reduction in consumption expenditure (especially in public 
consumption) and in Gross Domestic Investment (GDI).  GDI fell an average 40% in 
1998. 
 
 The Monetary Sector saw an equally drastic contraction.  M2 growth reduced 
sharply in both Malaysia and Thailand.  Korea however, recorded an increase in M2 
growth.  Monetary contraction was most evident where interest rates and credit growth 
were concerned.  3 month interbank rates, already high as part of currency defense in 
1997 remained at approximately 15%  the subsequent year.  With banks already 
convulsing from rising NPLs, they  simply cut back on new loans.  Domestic credit 
growth turned negative in 1998.  Again Korea was the exception, credit growth 
continued, albeit at half 1997 rates. 
 
 The sharply contractionary policies, both fiscal and monetary were sensible.  
They were aimed at currency stabilization and restoring confidence.  The earlier 
mentioned capital outflows are evident when the Capital Account Balance as percent of 
GDP is examined.  All three countries show negative balances for both years, implying 
net capital outflows.  Interestly, Malaysia has the highest negative balance as percent of 
GDP.  Table A 11, shows the portfolio investment flows in US$ billions.  Once again it is 
Malaysia that appears to have had the highest outflows.  In fact Malaysia continues with 
negative portfolio flows in every subsequent year.  The unemployment rate, an indicator 
of the pain and social cost to the economy shows a rise in all three countries.  The 
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steepest increase being for South Korea.  Still, given the extent of  the crisis, these 
unemployment numbers are surprisingly tame.  With a 6.8% unemployment rate at the 
depth of the crisis  (Table A13), and a low inflation environment, the social cost would 
not have been substantial.  This is especially so, when considering the fact that most 
countries have higher unemployment even in normal times.  Overall, as Figure 1 below 
shows, the period of the crisis, effectively about 4 quarters,  was sharp but short. 
 
SECTION 4: Post Crisis Recovery 
 If policies during the crisis were contractionary,  they were aimed at stabilization.  
This stage lasted from about the third quarter of 1997 to approximately the third quarter 
of 1998.  With some degree of stabilization in place a second stage of pro-growth 
policies were put in place.  Here the policies were a reversal of the earlier ones and were 
markedly expansionary. 
 
 If the depth and speed of the downturn was surprising, the sharp and quick 
recovery was equally surprising.  By about the 2nd quarter of 1999,  real GDP growth 
was positive for all three countries.  Strong growth  in the global economy in 1999 and 
2000 helped in no small measure.    With all three countries registering positive growth in 
every subsequent year, the recovery was real.  By far the strongest recovery was that of 
South Korea’s.   The growth numbers in Table A1 and their plot in Figure 1,  shows a 
decline and recovery pattern that appears the same for all three countries.  Yet, this 
masks two key differences among the countries.  The first was the very different 
government policy stance  to the crisis and second, the vastly differently growth drivers 
fuelling the recovery. 
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Figure 1 
FIGURE 1:  REAL GDP GROWTH (%)
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 4.1: Different Policy Stance 
 Though the macroeconomic policies undertaken to counter the crisis were 
similar, the policy reaction was different.  Faced with large capital outflows and a 
potential implosion of their domestic economies, the crisis countries had to either put a 
stop to further outflows or seek new inflows to avoid collapse.  It is here that vastly 
different paths were taken.  Malaysia chose to impose capital controls and peg its 
currency, while both Thailand and Korea chose the route of IMF financing.  Given the 
immensity of the crisis, the IMF put together large official financing packages. These 
amounted to a total US$58 billion for Korea, $17 billion for Thailand and $36 billion for 
Indonesia9.  The IMF packages had 3 initiatives, (i) official financing, (ii) requirements for 
structural reform and (iii) macroeconomic policies.  As we saw in the previous section, 
                                                 
9
 See - Lane (1999) 
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despite these different paths, the macroeconomic policies to counter the crisis were 
largely the same.   
 
4.2: Different Growth  Drivers 
 While on the surface the recovery appears largely similar for all three countries, a 
deeper analysis of the data points to quite different growth drivers.  These differences 
are most obvious when comparing Malaysian and Korean data.  Malaysia’s  recovery 
appears to have been fueled by Government Consumption and very strong export 
performance.  Korea’s recovery appears much more broad based with less reliance on 
government expenditure. 
 
 In examining real sector variables of Tables A2, A3 and A10, A14 which show 
Private, Public consumption, Gross Domestic Investment and Foreign Direct Investment, 
the differences  are glaring.  While Malaysia has the highest public sector consumption 
for 1999 and subsequent years, Korea has the highest private sector consumption 
numbers.  Table A2 confirms this.  The government budget balance has been negative 
since 1998 for Malaysia and continues to grow larger as a proportion of GDP.  Korea’s 
budget balance  on the other hand, has been positive since 2000.  The GDI and FDI 
numbers show both a sharp increase in 1999 and strong subsequent performance for 
Korea.  The portfolio investment data – Table A11, shows a similar picture.  While 
strongly positive for Korea, Malaysia (and Thailand) experienced portfolio outflows in 
each subsequent year. 
 
 The monetary sector data, reinforce the differences between the two countries.  
Despite sharply reduced interest rates (3 month interbank rate Table A20), growth in 
Bank Credit to Private Sector and overall Domestic Credit growth (Tables A15, A16) 
 19
remain anaemic for Malaysia but are strongly positive for Korea.  Performance in the 
external sector as shown in the Current Account Balance, tells a different story.  The 
Current Account  which was in deficit for all three countries every year pre-crisis, turns 
positive (Table A17).  This reversal is most prominent for Malaysia.  Testimony  to the 
very strong export performance on the back of an undervalued currency. 
 
Unemployment, NPLs and Foreign Reserves :  Korea Vs Malaysia 
 We examine three other variables, the unemployment rate, NPL (non performing 
loans) and Gross International Reserves to compare the relative recovery in our sample 
countries.  Table A13 shows the annual percentage unemployment rate.  In 1998, 
Korea’s unemployment rate of 6.8% was the highest and more than twice Malaysia’s 
rate.  By 2002 however, both Korea and Thailand have unemployment rates lower than 
Malaysia’s.  Despite the recovery, Malaysia’s unemployment appears to have grown 
marginally higher.  NPLs, seen as barometer of banking sector recovery, is lowest for 
Korea10.  At 2.2% of total commercial bank loans, Korean NPLs11 are barely a quarter 
Malaysia’s rate of 9.2% and Thailand’s 15.9%.  Korea’s better relative performance 
however, is most evident in the build up of Gross International Reserves.  Measured in 
US$ billions, Table A12 shows Korea’s reserves to be marginally lower than Malaysia’s 
in 1997.  As at end 2002 however, Korea’s reserves are almost 4 times Malaysias. 
 
4.3: Structural Reforms 
 Since leverage was at the heart of the crisis, the main aim of structural reforms in 
all three countries was “deleveraging”.  This was carried out in two steps.  The first, to 
clean up the mess from the crisis and second, to strengthen the cleaned out structure 
that remains.  The first step involved the intervention by way of capital infusion to 
                                                 
10
 See; Asia Economic Monitor 2003. 
11
 Korea’s much  smaller percentage is also reflective of the much faster growth in bank credit in post crisis period. 
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resuscitate viable institutions while closing down the unviable ones.  These are standard 
IMF procedures and therefore applied in Thailand and Korea.  Where Malaysia differed, 
it was in absorbing  rather than  closing down weak entities.  Absorption was by means 
of mergers/acquisition.  The second step of strengthening the system was fairly similar in 
all three countries. 
 
 Since there was a “twin-crisis”, the structural reforms were aimed at both the 
corporate and banking sectors.  In Malaysia for example, three key institutions were 
established to initiate the reforms.  There were the CDRC (Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Corporation), Danaharta and Danamodal.  While the first two had a role in both steps of 
the structural reform, Danamodal was intended only for the first step.  It’s role was to 
provide the capital injection needed to resuscitate the weaker banks that were on the 
verge of collapsing.  Capital was provided in exchange for  an equity stake.  In Thailand 
and Korea this task was undertaken directly by the central banks.  Malaysia’s CDRC 
was tasked with working out the problems of the heavily indebted firms.  This was done 
largely through rescheduling of debt, some asset sales and acquisitions.  Since most of 
Malaysia’s heavily indebted firms had little foreign currency denominated loans, relative 
to the other two countries, CDRC’s  work of having to work with the local lenders was 
much easier.   
 
 The third agency, Danaharta was the classic asset management company 
(AMC).  It’s counter parts in Korea and Thailand were the KAMCO (Korean Asset 
Management Co.) and TAMC (Thai Asset Management Co.).  The AMCs were tasked 
with relieving the banking sector of NPLs by carving out the bad-loans.  This was to be 
done by purchasing  problem loans from banks, repackaging/inventorying them until they 
can be sold; - usually by public tender/auction. 
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 Relative to the other two countries, Malaysia’s Danaharta has probably been the 
most effective.  Early changes in legislation to give the agency legislative muscle went a 
long way in enabling Danaharta to move quickly to a resolution.  At the other extreme is 
TAMC.  Lacking legislative backing, the Thai AMC was left to negotiate with banks on 
voluntary terms, thereby  making it much less successful.  As such, inclusive of assets 
still held by TAMC, the NPL ratio for Thailand is 18%.  For Korea and Malaysia when 
assets held by their AMCs are included, NPL ratio is 8% and 9.6% respectively.  Korea’s 
ratio being smaller due to the much faster growth in domestic credit in the post crisis 
period.  If expected recovery rates are an indicator of the efficiency of an AMC, 
Malaysia’s Danaharta has outpaced the others with a 56% recovery rate.  This 
compares to KAMCO’s 47% and TAMC’s 45%.12 
 
 In addition to AMCs, the banking sector in all three countries underwent major 
restructuring.  Weaker banks were merged or allowed to be acquired by stronger ones.  
In Thailand and Korea, foreign acquisition or foreign equity participation in domestic 
banks was made possible.  This was in line with IMF policies to do away with weak 
banks.  In Malaysia, a wave of central bank orchestrated mergers led from 37 
commercial banks pre-crisis to ten currently. 
 
Section 5:  Conclusion – What Can We Learn 
 In identifying the lessons that we can learn from the crisis and recovery, we begin 
with a synopsis of our analysis thus far.  A number of commonalities are apparent.  In 
the period leading to the crisis, there clearly were structural weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in all three countries.  These structural problems were very much in line 
with Krugman (1979).  The hypothesis that this was a self-fulfilling crisis ala Sachs et al 
(1996, 2001), implying a previous degree of misbehavior is also applicable. 
                                                 
12
 See; ADB, Asia Economic Monitor, July 2003. 
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 The key commonality across all  three countries is the similarity in growth 
patterns during the 13 year period of this study.  All three had very impressive growth 
pre-crisis, were hit just as hard during the crisis and had an equally impressive recovery.  
The reason for this is obvious, all three countries had similar macroeconomic and 
structural reform policies.  This, despite Malaysian government rhetoric that they were 
on an unorthodox path, whereas Korea and Thailand on orthodox IMF style policies.  
Malaysia’s unorthodox package appears largely similar to the IMF package.  What was 
dissimilar was the Capital Controls and Currency Peg announced on 1st September 
1998.  This begs the question, how much more did the capital controls and peg help 
Malaysia?  Based on our analysis thus far, one would be hard pressed to show any 
added advantage from these policies.  These policies probably had more to do with the 
subsequent political problems in Malaysia than with economic rationale.  The 
reputational cost obviously did not lead to better payoff in economic terms.  To be sure, 
Malaysia has seen less bankruptcies and the attendant increase in unemployment 
during the crisis.  While this would have reduced the pain, it does not help with long term 
competitiveness. 
 
 In the event, it was classic Keynesian style fiscal expansion and export growth 
benefiting from undervalued currency, that led to recovery.  Including fiscal 2003, 
Malaysia would have had its sixth consecutive year of budget deficit (Table A18), much 
higher than Thailand’s and in sharp contrast to South Korea’s budget surpluses.  Neither 
of these two growth drivers are sustainable over the long term.  Private consumption, 
domestic investment, credit growth and  foreign capital inflows must recover if growth is 
to be sustainable.   
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 While Thailand’s recovery and growth resembles that of Malaysia, Korea has 
outpaced both.  In addition to faster GDP growth, Korea which followed the orthodox IMF 
package has done better when we go by factors such  as, unemployment rate, NPL, 
International Reserves, Market Capitalization13 and overall breadth of recovery. 
 
Lessons 
 So, what can we learn from the experience of these countries?  A number of 
useful lessons can be deduced.  The first and most obvious lesson is that vulnerability 
should be avoided.  This means one has to be watchful about the build up of leverage / 
debt financing.  Beyond a low threshold, the financing of such debt with foreign currency 
exposures must be avoided.  Since the need for debt and external financing arises from 
the need to grow at any cost, governments must reorientate growth strategies.  A slower 
but better quality growth strategy makes sense.  One that has a better absorption rate of 
domestic resources and higher value added. 
 
 The sequencing of financial liberalization is certainly important.  As we saw in the 
case of Thailand and Korea, inappropriate sequencing can be a major cause of 
vulnerability.  In this regard, unless the banking system is strong and globally 
competitive, domestic banks should not be allowed to take on huge currency exposures.  
Building a strong banking system would not be possible under the current protectionist 
mode.  Banking systems should be subject to market discipline.  Capital account 
liberalization while simultaneously protecting the domestic banking system may lead to 
the worst of both situations. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 In 1996, market capitalization in Malaysia and Korea was US$319 bil. and US$139 bil. respectively.  In 2002 
however, Malaysia’s capitalization had fallen to US$127 bil. whereas Korea’s risen to US$219 bil. 
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 Developing less bank reliant financial systems would also be helpful.  In all three 
crisis countries the financial sector was heavily bank dependent.  The problem with this 
is that, risks get concentrated.  Risks will be dissipated if alternative financing 
mechanisms are enhanced.  For example, attention should be paid to building better 
bond and money markets. 
 
 The experience of the three countries shows the importance of avoiding 
exchange rate misalignment.  Pegged or quasi pegged systems are incompatible with 
independent monetary policies in the presence of free capital flows.  Central banks as 
we saw, often ignore this incompatibility – with disastrous consequences.  Quasi pegged 
systems also lulls the private sector into taking on unhedged foreign exchange 
exposures.  Currency Risk management becomes the obligation of the Central bank.  
This again is unsustainable over the long term.  There is a need to ‘privatize’ risk 
management by developing the markets and tools for hedging.   Central banks should 
also  pay close attention to the ratio of useable foreign reserves to short term obligation.  
A low ratio is a sure sign of vulnerability.    
 
In addition to the above obvious ones, there are three implicit lessons to be learnt 
from the experience.  The first is that, the old government directed industrialization 
models may not be workable anymore.  The worst culprits in all three countries had been 
the state connected conglomerates that were the result of such industrialization.  It is 
these entities that had taken on the highest debt and foreign currency exposures. 
 
 The second implicit lesson is that temporary capital controls  may not be as bad 
as previously thought.  Malaysia’s capital controls, were highly selective and effectively 
short in duration.  Today most of the controls have been relaxed.  What hurt most was 
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the one year moratorium  on capital outflows.  (Except where it involved trade).  While 
most economists have little objection to temporary capital controls – especially on capital 
inflows, the moratorium on outflows was highly controversial.  Many of the dire 
predictions made about the controls have not borne out.  While it is still early to asses 
the long term consequences  of the policy, going by our post crisis data, Malaysia has 
not been worse off.  We concluded earlier, that despite the controversial policies 
Malaysia’s performance does not show any added advantage.  Thus, one can only 
conclude that if Malaysia was not better off with these policies, it was no worse off either. 
 
 A final implicit lesson, perhaps even an obvious one is that IMF policies have 
worked.  One could always argue about the harshness of the policies and its social 
impact.  But the fact remains that both Thailand and Korea have snapped back into 
strong recovery.  The sharp V-shaped recovery following IMF intervention is not new nor 
peculiar to these two countries.  Mexico is a case in point.  Following a similar currency 
crisis and capital flight, Mexico went into a tailspin in December 1994.  However, by end 
1996 the economy had almost fully recovered.  Mexico too had been on an IMF 
package. 
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TABLE A1: REAL GDP GROWTH (%) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Q1.03 Q2.03 
MALAYSIA 9 8.7 7.8 8.3 9.2 9.8 8.6 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.3 0.4 4.2   
S. KOREA 9 8.5 4.8 5.5 8.1 8.9 5.5 5 -6.7 10.9 9.3 3.1 6.3 3.7 1.9 
THAILAND 11.2 8.1 7.6 7.7 8.5 9.2 7.1 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.6 1.9 5.2   
 
 
TABLE A2: PRIVATE CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GROWTH (%) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA 11.9 14.3 7.5 9.8 13.2 11.7 9.6 9.3 -10.2 2.9 12.5 2.8 4.2 
S. KOREA 9.6 21.1 14.8 14 18.7 9.6 13.2 9.1 -11.7 11 7.9 4.7 6.8 
THAILAND 12.9 11.6 12.5 11.7 13.1 7.8 11.6 4.4 -11.5 4.3 4.9 3.7 4.7 
 
 
TABLE A3: PUBLIC CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE GROWTH (%) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA 5.9 12.7 5.9 10.9 10.2 6.1 2.4 8.9 -8.9 17.1 3 17.6 13.8 
S. KOREA 7.4 21.3 16.8 10.4 12.3 0.8 -11 40.6 -0.4 1.3 0.1 1.3 2.9 
THAILAND 6.9 12.5 21.3 12.8 12.2 5.2 13.3 1.6 3.9 3.1 2.6 2.9 0.5 
 
 
TABLE A4: GROWTH OF MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (US $ FOB, %) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Q1.03 Q2.03 
MALAYSIA 17.4 18.7 9.7 17 27 20.2 6.5 12.1 29.7 12.2 16.1 -10 6   
S. KOREA 4.2 10.5 6.6 7.3 16.8 30.3 3.7 5 -2.8 8.6 19.9 -13 8 19.8 12 
THAILAND 14.2 23 13.6 13.5 21.6 23.6 0.4 27.9 24.4 -1.4 25.2 4.3 2.2   
 
 
TABLE A5: GROWTH OF MERCHANDISE IMPORTS (US $ CIF, %) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Q1.03 Q2.03 
MALAYSIA  30 27.4 3.6 15.7 32.8 24.6 1.5 12 3.3 8.9 25.3 -10 8.3   
S. KOREA 13.6 16.7 0.3 2.5 22.1 32 11.3 -3.8 -35.5 28.4 34 -12 7.8 19.1 8.5 
THAILAND 27.4 13.6 7.8 12.9 17.4 28.8 3.9 5 -7.8 7.5 30.8 10.5 0.8   
 
 
TABLE A6:  SAVINGS - INVESTMENT GAP (AS % OF GDP) 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND (7.6) (6.4) (4.9) (4.5) (5.0) (7.5) (7.7) (6.2) 
S. KOREA (1.0) (2.5) (1.5) (0.8) (1.1) (1.5) (3.5) (1.7) 
MALAYSIA (3.3) (8.0) (4.7) (5.3) (7.3) (9.5) (5.5) (6.2) 
Source IMF:  World Econ. & Fin. Survey 
 
 
TABLE A7:  TOTAL FOREIGN LOANS (US $ MIL.) 
  
Dec-94 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-96 
THAILAND 43,879 62,818 69,409 70,147 69,382 
S. KOREA 56,599 77,528 88,027 99,953 103,432 
MALAYSIA 13,493 16,781 20,100 22,234 28,820 
Source : BIS, Business Times 
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TABLE A8:  TOTAL FOREIGN LOANS AS % OF GDP 
  
Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 
THAILAND 30.4 37.4 38.7 
S. KOREA 18.6 22.1 25.7 
MALAYSIA 18.6 19.2 22.4 
Author's Computation 
 
 
TABLE A9:  FINANCIAL POSITION (AS AT DECEMBER, 1996) 
  
Short Term 
Loans(US$ Mil.) 
Short Term Loans 
as % of Total 
Foreign Loans 
Foreign Loans as 
% of Reserves 
Short Term Loans 
as as % of Reserves 
THAILAND 45,733 65.20% 181% 118% 
S. KOREA 67,468 67.50% 300% 202.50% 
MALAYSIA 12,451 56.00% 83.90% 46.90% 
 
 
TABLE A10: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (US $ BIL) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA 2.33     6.64  5.56 2.71 2.47 1.76 0.29 1.3 
S. KOREA -0.26 -0.3 -0.43 -0.75 -1.7 -1.8 -2.3 -1.61 0.67 5.14 4.29 1.11 -0.7 
THAILAND 2.4   1.57 0.88 1.18 1.41 3.3 7.36 5.74 3.37 3.65 0.96 
 
 
TABLE A11: PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT (US $ BIL) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA -1.05       -4.39 -6.87 -1.2 -2.47 -0.7 -1.7 
S. KOREA 0.08 3.05 5.8 10 6.12 11.6 15.2 14.3 -1.88 8.68 12 6.58 0.18 
THAILAND 0.46   5 1.69 4.01 2.88 4.37 0.33 -0.1 -0.71 -1.2 -2.3 
 
 
TABLE A12: GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (US $ BIL) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Q1.03 Q2.03 
MALAYSIA 9.87 11 17.4 37.4 25.5 23.9 27.1 20.9 25.7 30.7 29.6 30.5 34.3   
S. KOREA 14.8 13.7 17.2 20.3 25.7 32.7 34.1 20.41 52 74.1 96.2 102 121  132 
THAILAND 14.3 18.4 21.2 25.4 30.3 37 38.7 26.89 29.5 34.8 32.7 33 38.9   
 
 
TABLE A13: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (%) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Q1.03 Q2.03 
MALAYSIA 5.1 4.3 3.7 3 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.7 3.5 3.8 na 
S. KOREA 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.4 2 2 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 3.7 3 3.6 3.3 
THAILAND 2.2 2.7 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9 4.4 4.2 3.6 3.3 2.4 2.9 2.5 
 
 
TABLE A14: GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT GROWTH (%) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 Q1.03 Q2.03 
MALAYSIA        12 -44 -4 28 -9 9 0.1 -2.3 
S. KOREA  15 -1 3 14 11 9 -8 -38 30 11 -2 4 7 2 
THAILAND     11 14 5 -22 -51 9 11 2 5 10  
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TABLE A15: GROWTH IN REAL BANK CREDIT TO PRIVATE SECTOR (%) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA  16 6 7 10 27 22 20 -2 -1 5 3 5 
S. KOREA  12 7 6 17 11 14 12 -6 17 16 13 21 
THAILAND  16 17 18 24 16 9 15 -13 -5 -11 -7 6 
 
 
TABLE A16: DOMESTIC CREDIT GROWTH (%) 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA 18 18.5 16.6 12.3 14.8 29.5 31.2 29.3 -2.7 0.3 9.6 -6.9 8.9 
S. KOREA 25 22.4 11.5 12.8 18.5 14.6 19.5 23.3 11.6 17.4 16.3   
THAILAND 26.8 15.5 18 22.7 29.4 23 14 34.5 -1.3 -4.2 -7.5   
 
TABLE A17: CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AS % OF GDP 
  90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA -2.1 -8.5 -3.7 -4.5 -6.1 -9.8 -4.8 -5.2 13.2 15.9 9.4 8.3 7.6 
S. KOREA -0.8 -2.8 -1.3 0.3 -1 -1.7 -4.4 -1.7 12.7 6 2.7 1.9 1.3 
THAILAND -8.4 -9 -8 -4.9 -5.4 -7.9 -7.9 -2 12.8 10.2 7.6 5.4 6 
 
 
TABLE  A18: GOVERNMENT BUDGET  BALANCE  AS % OF GDP 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA -2.9 -2 -0.8 0.2 2.3 0.8 0.7 2.4 -1.8 -3.2 -5.8 -5.5 -5.6 
S. KOREA -0.7 -1.6 -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 -1.5 -4.2 -2.7 1.3 1.3 3.8 
THAILAND 4.9 4 2.6 1.9 2.7 3 0.9 -1.5 -2.8 -3.4 -2.2 -2.4 -1.4 
 
 
TABLE A19: BROAD MONEY GROWTH, M2 (%) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA 13 12 16 17 20 24 21 23 2 14 5 2 6 
S. KOREA 17 20 14 15 17 23 15 14 24 5 5 8 14 
THAILAND 27 18 14 17 12 17 12 16 10 2 4 4 3 
 
 
TABLE A20: 3-MONTHS INTERBANK LENDING RATE (%) 
 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
MALAYSIA        9.0 11.5 4 3.2 3.2 3 
S. KOREA        14.1 14.6 6.8 7.1 5.2 4.8 
THAILAND        17 16.8 4.9 4 3.1 2.1 
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